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Invigorating the Content in Social
Embeddedness: An Ethnography of Life
Insurance Transactions in China1
Cheris Shun-ching Chan
University of Hong Kong
Based on more than 14 months’ ethnographic research in China,
this article brings in culture and symbolic interactionism to under-
stand the social embeddedness of economic transactions. First, an
analytic frame linking tie strengths to defining principles, relational
properties, and interactions is constructed and applied to changes
in life insurance transactions in China. The data suggest that strong
tie transactions were common until the economic gains of the sellers
were made public. The author argues that the ethical-affective prin-
ciple that defines strong ties and the high intensity of trust, affection,
and asymmetric obligation that constitute these ties make them a
double-edged sword for economic transactions. Instead, ties with
midrange or weak strength are more effective because of their re-
lational complementarity (although direct economic exchanges may
take place among strong ties under extreme institutional or contin-
gency conditions). The author also reveals that dramaturgical in-
teractions, through which economic actors exercise their agency, are
an integral part of embedded transactions.
Mark Granovetter’s (1973, 1974) strength-of-weak-ties theory has stim-
ulated volumes of research on the structural embeddedness of economic
activities (Bonacich 1987; Baker 1990; Burt 1992; Romo and Schwartz
1 I am indebted to all the informants who made my fieldwork possible. In addition,
Gary Fine, Bruce Carruthers, Wendy Griswold, Charles Ragin, and Bobai Li deserve
special thanks for their unfailing support to this project. I am grateful to Gary Fine,
Yanjie Bian, Jeff Manza, Ching Kwan Lee, Ethan Michelson, Peer Fiss, John Markoff,
Kathleen Blee, Debbie Gould, Assata Richards, Xiaodan Zhang, and the AJS reviewers
for helpful comments on the earlier versions of this article. Part of this article was
presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Atlanta
in August 2003. The research on which this article is based was funded by the Social
Science Research Council, the Center for International and Comparative Studies at
Northwestern University, and the Asian Studies Center at the University of Pittsburgh.
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1995). Innovative methodological techniques, including the use of math-
ematical steps for algorithm building, have advanced social network anal-
ysis to a rigorously formalized scientific field (White 1981; Watts and
Strogatz 1998). Network analysis, by definition, is formalistic and inter-
ested only in patterns of relations, not in substantive content (Burt 1986).
This, however, prompts the worry that the sophistication of structural
analytical techniques has unintentionally produced a “black box” problem
in network analysis (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). Swedberg (1997)
laments that social embeddedness has been reduced to network analysis
that is sterile and devoid of substance (see also White 1992). Prominent
economic sociologists earnestly call for bringing the content of social ties
back in (Stinchcombe 1990; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; Gerlach and
Lincoln 1998), particularly culture and meaning that define, realize, and
perform the relational content of embeddedness (Zelizer 1988; DiMaggio
1992; White 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Biggart and Beamish
2003). This article brings culture, meaning, and interaction to the forefront
by focusing on the relational content of social ties.
Granovetter (1973) acknowledged early on that both concrete personal
relations and structures (or networks) of such relations are equally im-
portant. In a less cited article, he elaborates and consolidates the concept
of embeddedness by distinguishing relational and structural embedded-
ness (Granovetter 1990). While structural embeddedness is defined by
networks of interpersonal relations, relational embeddedness is defined
by concrete interpersonal relationships among individual economic actors,
the meaning of the relational category, and the history of interactions and
consequent mutual expectations. Relational embeddedness, Granovetter
(1990) notes, has a direct effect on economic action and deserves the same
amount of attention as its structural counterpart. Fortunately, an increas-
ing number of scholars have been putting relational embeddedness at the
center of attention. Norms, trust, obligations, and expectations have been
integrated into the embeddedness literature (e.g., Wellman and Wortley
1990; Gerlach 1992; Davis and Greve 1997; Podolny and Baron 1997;
Brinton and Nee 1998; Wellman 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). Harrison
White, who was formerly a leading figure in structural determinism, has
more recently claimed a central role for meanings in network analysis. A
social network, in his words, is “a network of meanings” (White 1992, p.
65).
I also thank the Centre of Asian Studies at the University of Hong Kong for its facilities
and the International Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles, for its
generous fellowship, which facilitated the completion of this article. Direct corre-
spondence to Cheris Shun-ching Chan, Department of Sociology, Room 1217 K. K.
Leung Building, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. Email:
cherisch@hku.hk
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Based on an ethnographic case study of life insurance transactions in
China, this article presents a microscopic picture of how relational content
affects economic exchanges. By relational content, I mean the defining
principles and relational properties that qualify different tie strengths and
the interactions between actors in those ties. The theoretical frame is
broadly informed by relational embeddedness that focuses on the sub-
stantive content of social relations (Dore 1983; Sako 1992; Uzzi 1997; Uzzi
and Lancaster 2003), cultural economic sociology that highlights meanings
in defining different types of relationships (Biggart 1989; Zelizer 1996,
2005), social exchange theory that gives insights into the role of reciprocity
in economic exchanges (Gouldner 1960; Homans 1974), and symbolic in-
teractionism, particularly Goffman’s (1959, 1967, 1983) interaction order
that focuses on the strategic capacities of individuals in different structural
positions. While most embeddedness studies are based on quantitative
methods (Powell [1985] and Uzzi [1997] offer two exceptional examples),
this study takes a rather different approach. It applies not only interviews
but year-long participant observations in the natural settings in which
economic transactions occur. Based on process-oriented field research, this
article explores the dynamics through which tie strengths are linked to
direct economic transactions in a non-Western context.
Selling and buying life insurance belongs to a kind of negotiated direct
economic exchanges in which actors engage in explicit bargaining to reach
a bilateral agreement that economically benefits both parties (Blau 1964;
Homans 1974; Emerson 1981; Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999). In
contrast to “negotiated exchanges” are “reciprocal exchanges” in which
actors perform a beneficial act for another without knowing whether,
when, and how the other will reciprocate (Molm et al. 1999). In com-
mercial life insurance transactions, sellers and buyers negotiate over the
prices and terms of coverage through potential buyers’ shopping around
and sellers’ calculation of profitability. Negotiation takes place because
one party’s sizable gains can be another party’s losses. Therefore, life
insurance transactions represent a common form of economic exchange
in a monetary market economy. In addition, it is a case in which social
embeddedness is particularly high. The public resistance to the commen-
surating logic of life insurance (Zelizer 1979; Espeland and Stevens 1998)
requires life insurance firms to deploy aggressive personal solicitation
through sales agents’ strategic interactions with prospects (Oakes 1990;
Leidner 1993). This highly embedded nature of life insurance sales pro-
vides rich data for the possibility of characterizing different forms of
socially embedded exchanges. Conducting the research in mainland
China, where the life insurance industry is just in its emergent stage,
further supplies rich nuances for an indicative, dynamical dissection.
Commercial life insurance is emerging in China at the intersection of
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the country’s transformation from a socialist to a market economy and
the global expansion of the insurance industry. Although many European
and North American life insurers entered China during the imperialist
expansions of the late 19th century, the life insurance industry generally
failed to take hold in mainland China (Wu and Zheng 1993). Then, during
the Maoist regime and early post-Maoist years that spanned an entire
generation (the 1950s to the 1980s), commercial life insurance essentially
disappeared. It was not until 1992 that commercial life insurance appeared
in the People’s Republic of China for the first time, when American
International Assurance Limited (AIA), a subsidiary of American Inter-
national Group Limited, arrived in Shanghai. Local resistance to life
insurance as a new concept and a new commodity was evident (Chan
2009), but AIA pioneered a proactive personal and commission-based
agency sales system to market this new commodity. Within a few years,
a number of domestic and Sino-foreign joint-venture life insurance com-
panies were established, first in Shanghai and subsequently in other major
cities. They all adopted an aggressive, commission sales method to create
a life insurance market.
While the commission sales system was new to the local population,
using personal relations to achieve economic transactions was not. The
pervasiveness and dominance of guanxi (interpersonal relations or con-
nections) in Chinese economies have been well documented by sociologists
and anthropologists (Walder 1986; Bian 1994, 1997; Yang 1994; Wank
1996; Yan 1996; Wong and Salaff 1998). For life insurance sales, the role
of guanxi is indisputably crucial. However, an empirical puzzle over the
use of guanxi for life insurance sales was observed. Life insurance trans-
actions among intimate guanxi were prevalent in the early stages when
life insurance was first introduced. Toward the end of the 1990s and the
early 2000s, however, sales agents avoided selling directly to close friends
and relatives. Instead, they spent most of their time and energy selling
themselves to impress acquaintances or building friendships with existing
clients for referrals. Thus, there was a shift in which life insurance trans-
actions occurred in relation to the strengths of ties between sellers and
buyers. They moved from strong ties to moderate and weak ties. Why
did such a shift take place?
A plausible explanation based on the structural aspect of the strength-
of-weak-ties hypothesis is that the agents might have exhausted their
intimate circles and then needed to extend the pool of potential clients
by reaching distant acquaintances and clients’ networks (Granovetter
1973, 1974; Baker 1990; Burt 1992). Undoubtedly, salespersons cannot
solely rely on their intimate circles; at some point they will need to extend
their pool of potential clients. However, this explanation is inadequate.
First, the problem of agents exhausting existing intimate circles had not
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occurred. Note that the annual turnover rate of insurance agents in China
was as high as 80%.2 As the agents did not form a fixed pool of people,
there were always new agents who could bring in new intimate social
circles. More important, if the agents simply needed to extend the pool
of prospects, they could do so in addition to selling to close intimates.
Why, then, did the agents begin avoiding selling to close friends and
relatives? Furthermore, why did this tendency begin at the end of the
1990s but not earlier?
My findings indicate that when life insurance as a commodity is new
and alien to a population, when market regulations have not yet been
established, and, most important, when the economic interests of the sales
agents are covert, transactions take place among strong ties in which
trust, affection, and asymmetric obligation are the core relational prop-
erties. However, when the economic gains of the sales agents are visible
and obvious, their motives for selling the commodity then appear to be
blatantly self-interested. A self-interested motive for interacting with close
intimates violates the ethical-affective principle that defines a close re-
lationship. This violation deters both parties from entering into a direct
transaction for the sake of preserving their existing relationship. My ar-
gument is that strong ties are double-edged for direct economic trans-
actions. They are inherently a less desirable relational category for eco-
nomic transactions, not only because of their structural limitations but
also because the cultural rules that define and govern strong ties are
uncongenial to transactions that involve explicit bargaining of economic
interests. Ties with midrange to weak strength are better for economic
transactions because of their relational complementarity. Their relatively
balanced composition of relational properties and mixed defining prin-
ciples results in content flexibility that leaves more room for legitimating
economic exchanges motivated by self-interest. However, under certain
extreme institutional or contingency conditions, economic transactions
may have to take place only in strong ties in which trust, affection, and
obligation are facilitative. Regardless of where the embedded transactions
take place, dramaturgical efforts are required, especially on the parties
who seek exchanges. I argue that it is through dramaturgical performances
and interactions that individual economic actors exercise their agency to
maneuver their relational qualities and structural positions in a network
for their economic purposes.
2 No official figure of agents’ turnover rate is available. However, almost all managers
and senior agents whom I interviewed gave a rather consistent estimate at 80%. This
high turnover rate was also found in the insurance industry in the United States.
Leidner (1993, p. 95) reported that the average five-year retention rate of sales agents
in the insurance industry in the United States was only 18%.
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In the sections that follow, I first develop an analytic frame that links
tie strengths to their defining principles, relational properties, and expected
interactions for economic exchanges. The analytic frame is then applied
to characterize the Chinese social relations, guanxi. After a section on
method and data collection, I rely on the analytic frame to illustrate the
possible explanations for the change in life insurance transactions in re-
lation to the strengths of ties between Chinese sellers and buyers. I analyze
how and why three different forms of socially embedded life insurance
transactions, namely, reflexive trust, obligation, and personage, take place
in different tie strengths under different conditions. I discuss the gener-
alizability of the analysis after an encapsulation of my arguments. The
theoretical contributions and limitations of this study, as well as the im-
plications for future research, are discussed in the concluding section.
AN ANALYTIC FRAME: TIE STRENGTHS AND ECONOMIC
TRANSACTIONS
To define tie strengths in terms of their relational content, I propose an
analytic frame that draws useful concepts and insights from the literature
of social embeddedness, cultural sociology, social exchange theory, and
symbolic interactionism.3 This analytic frame is based on two postulates
as represented in figure 1.
First, individual actors differentiate among the meanings, operating
rules, and boundaries that separate one relation from another (Zelizer
2005). It is postulated that the meanings that define and the operating
rules that govern various tie strengths can be marked at points on a
continuum between ethical-affective and instrumental-monetary domains.
Strong ties are defined by a high degree of affections and ethical obli-
gations. Very weak ties or arm’s-length ties, however, are defined by a
high degree of instrumental and monetary capacities. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that although intimate circles operate primarily in the
ethical-affective domain, they serve important instrumental functions.4
The meanings and operating principles of different ties, therefore, are not
defined by their functions, but rather by culturally and socially acceptable
motives (Uzzi 1997, 1999). The stronger the ties are, the more the motives
are expected to be altruistic and expressive. Because intimate relationships
by definition place demanding claims on moral appropriateness, the
boundaries that delineate strong ties are relatively inflexible. However,
3 For a methodological discussion of why analytic frames are preferred for qualitative
research, see Ragin (1994, pp. 55–102).
4 Parents feeding their children and people lending money to close friends are two
simple examples of intimate relations serving important instrumental functions.
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Fig. 1.—An analytic frame linking tie strengths to defining principles and relational
properties. The star scores assigned to each cell represent the hypothetical intensity of each
relational property in a given tie strength.
the weaker the ties are, the looser the boundaries are when drawing
inclusions from exclusions.
A second postulate is that tie strength is a continuous variable (Gra-
novetter 1973; Krackhardt 1992; Guseva 2008) and different degrees of
tie strength embody different compositions of the relational properties of
trust, affection, asymmetric obligation, symmetric obligation, and calcu-
lation. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical model that links the intensity of
each relational property to a particular strength of tie. This model posits
that the stronger the social ties are, the more they bear the elements of
trust, affection, and asymmetric obligation and the less they bear elements
of symmetric obligation and calculation. The social network and social
exchange literature has long recognized that mutual trust and affection
are essential elements of close and intimate relationships. The closer a
relationship is, the stronger the sense of trust and the feelings of affection
are between members (Wellman and Wortley 1990; Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson 2000). Another key element that characterizes and reproduces
strong ties is asymmetric obligation that defines the norm of reciprocity.
According to Gouldner (1960), reciprocity connotes that each party has
rights and obligations, and one party’s right is in turn the other party’s
obligation. Unlike trust and affection that can be simultaneously mutual,
reciprocity is an exchange of rights and obligations that often involves a
time lag. Gouldner argues that indebtedness, created by the time lag
between Ego’s provision of a gratification and Alter’s repayment, is a
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kind of “moral cement” that reproduces and stabilizes social relations (p.
175). Generally, the closer a relationship is, say a parent-child relationship,
the longer the time lag is allowed and expected for exchange of rights
and obligations.5 This means that the delivery of obligations in an intimate
relationship is often asymmetric. However, an immediate exchange of
rights and obligations is expected in impersonal transactions that take
place among arm’s-length ties. Apparently, many social and economic
exchanges take place in relations that fall in between parent-child and
arm’s-length ties. But we can expect that asymmetric obligation is a con-
stituent element of strong ties whereas symmetric obligation is an im-
portant element of weak ties. Finally, the calculation of costs and benefits
that are based on self-interest is more likely to be present among weak
ties. With strong ties, too much instrumental calculation debases the al-
truistic and expressive meanings attached to close and intimate relation-
ships.
To use this analytic frame to project which kinds of relations better
facilitate economic transactions, I find Uzzi’s concept of complementarity
useful. In his study of firms seeking financing, Uzzi (1999) finds that
networks with a mix of both embedded and arm’s-length ties are the
optimal type of networks for firms’ performance, since networks as such
are able to synthesize the benefits of different types of ties into what he
called “network complementarity.” On the basis of this complementarity
logic, we can project that tie strengths with relatively balanced compo-
sition of various relational properties are the best category of ties for
dyadic direct economic transactions. Ties as such are able to achieve
relational complementarity by synthesizing the benefits of different re-
lational properties. Then, the best types of relations for economic ex-
changes are those in the middle (cols. 3 and 4 in fig. 1). Former school-
mates, colleagues, neighbors, ordinary friends, and distant relatives are
some examples. These ties, with midrange strength, allow calculative and
economically driven exchanges and yet still possess a certain degree of
trust, affection, and obligation. Relatively fair exchanges are expected,
though a less precise calculation is required. However, the strongest ties
(col. 1 in fig. 1), defined by an ethical-affective principle, are generally
not the best type for negotiated economic exchanges. While the presence
of a strong sense of trust can certainly reduce transaction costs (Granovet-
ter 1985; Uzzi 1996; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Sako and Helper 1998;
Guseva 2008), the elements of affection and asymmetric obligation are
unfavorable to instrumental, self-interest-oriented economic transactions.
5 For example, a parent typically delivers asymmetric obligations to a child until the
child has grown up. The child may (or may not) return the indebted favor to the
parent when the parent is old and needs her or his care.
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The weakest ties (col. 6 and beyond in fig. 1) are not the best category
for business deals either. The lack of trust and the constant calculation
of costs and benefits in those ties are likely to induce higher transaction
costs. This is especially the case in an institutional environment in which
formal law and regulations that warrant fair transactions are underde-
veloped or ineffective (see Guseva and Rona-Tas [2001] and Guseva [2008]
on Russia and Peng [2004] on China).
The above projection, however, is based on a static model. When eco-
nomic actors and their interactions are integrated into the analytic frame,
economic transactions may take place in very strong ties and very weak
ties with dramaturgical strategies. In Goffman’s (1959) terms, for an Ego
to influence an Alter’s definition of the situation, the former has to give
off a certain impression so that she or he can control the behaviors of the
latter. Goffman’s interaction theories are particularly useful for examining
the “black box” between individual actors’ structural positions and eco-
nomic outcomes. In line with the embeddedness account is Goffman’s
rejection of an atomized cost-benefit analysis and focus on the importance
of “one’s place in the social structure” for understanding actors’ inter-
actions (1983, p. 6). With Goffman’s insights added into the framework,
sellers can hide or downplay their economic gains when dealing with
those in strong ties so as to transform the negotiated exchanges to appear
as reciprocal ones. Alternatively, they can cultivate a higher degree of
trust, affection, and sense of obligation with weakly tied potential buyers
in order to smooth transactions.
To what extent can this analytic frame be applied to places with dif-
ferent cultural and institutional settings? Hamilton (1996) gravely ques-
tions the validity of applying theoretical tools developed from Western
networks to Asian networks. He contrasts the Asian networks with West-
ern ones, suggesting that the organizing principles of the former are based
on norms, relations, hierarchy, and substance whereas those of the latter
are based on voluntarism and individualism. While I agree with his char-
acterization of the organizing principles of the Asian networks, I cannot
agree that the Western networks are in sharp contrast. As Macneil (1985)
points out, the assumption of voluntaristic choice in contracting, even in
the most market-oriented American context, is false. The relational norms
that enforce obligation and “coerce” people into contractual arrangements
are evident in market-oriented economies (pp. 503–4). I believe that the
Western networks appear to be voluntaristic and individualistic partly
because of the scarcity of thick descriptions of the normative and relational
dynamics in conventional network analysis. Macaulay’s (1963) classic
piece on the enforcing power of norms, expectations, and reputations and
the recent efforts to return to study networks’ substances all suggest that
mutual trust, affection, and the norm of reciprocity have significant im-
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pacts on people’s market behaviors across nations (Dore 1983; Gerlach
1992; Krackhardt 1992; Uzzi 1997, 1999; Sako and Helper 1998; Guseva
and Rona-Tas 2001). Thus, I propose that the above analytic frame can
be applied to both Western and Asian contexts. The defining principles
and the direction of intensity of the relational properties in different tie
strengths are universal. In other words, trust, affection, and asymmetric
obligation must be higher in strong ties than in weak ties and symmetric
obligation and calculation must be higher in weak ties than in strong ties.
However, the level of intensity of the relational properties in each box in
figure 1 may vary across spatial and temporal contexts. Hence, applying
the analytic frame to a Chinese context requires some modifications to
the model.
APPLYING THE ANALYTIC FRAME TO THE CHINESE GUANXI
Scholarly debates over the nature of guanxi and its role in economic life
are constellated along three axes. First, do strong ties work better than
weak ties in China because of unique political and institutional arrange-
ments (Bian 1997; Lin 2002; Wank 2002)? Second, is the importance of
guanxi in economic life declining, persistent, or intensified in conjunction
with China’s economic reform (Gold 1985; Guthrie 1998; Lin 2001; Bian
2002; Hanser 2002)? Finally, is the characteristic and basic nature of
Chinese guanxi unique or universal (Hwang 1987; Lin 2001; Wellman,
Chen, and Dong 2002)? This article engages in these debates as follows.
First, instead of challenging or supporting the strong-ties-matter hy-
pothesis, this article explores under what conditions strong ties facilitate
or impede direct economic transactions, and why. Bian and Ang’s (1997)
comparative studies of job mobility in Singapore and Tianjin (a city in
northern China) find that ties of medium strength operate most effectively
in both cities. They call for future research on the meanings and impli-
cations of social ties of medium strength to understand the limits of ties
that are either too close or too distant. This article certainly has impli-
cations in this respect.
Second, Guthrie (1998, 1999) finds that the rational-legal model of busi-
ness practices has been gaining legitimacy in urban China, and as a result,
there has been a decline in the use of personal guanxi in business trans-
actions. He argues that increasing institutionalization leads to declining
significance of guanxi in the Chinese economy. This study finds a shift in
where transactions take place among strong ties versus moderate and
weak ties. At first sight this shift may seem to support the hypothesis of
the declining significance of guanxi. However, since embeddedness persists
in a market economy and the effect of social relations does not disappear
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in markets in which uncertainty is low (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi and Lan-
caster 2004), the increasing marketization and institutionalization in
China have not diminished the role of guanxi, though its manifestations
vary. As there are many different types of guanxi (Walder 1986; Wank
1996; Michelson 2007), the declining use of one particular type does not
indicate the decreasing importance of guanxi per se. More important, as
the data will show, turning away from strong ties in making transactions
is precisely what preserves the significant meanings of intimate guanxi.
When turning to loose ties for transactions, the sales agents have been
making an effort to create closer relationships with prospects in order to
succeed. They would not have to do so if guanxi were declining in
importance.
As to what extent Chinese guanxi is unique or universal, this article
takes the position that there is nothing inherently unique about guanxi.
Lin (2001) points out that the sentimental basis, obligatory exchanges,
and instrumental uses of guanxi, in fact, demonstrate only traits of social
exchanges in Homans’s theory. Therefore, the mechanisms through which
guanxi of different types impedes or facilitates economic exchanges among
the Chinese should not be assumed qualitatively distinct. Nonetheless,
the structure of Chinese guanxi and aspects of its content are distinguish-
able from the conventional features of social networks in Anglo-Saxon
societies. These unique features of guanxi led me to modify the analytic
frame for the Chinese case, as represented in figure 2. Note that the
intensity (represented by the star scores) of each relational property in
this figure may be different from that in figure 1.
The modified analytic frame is derived largely from existing literature
about Chinese guanxi. First, I rely on the prominent Chinese sociologist
Xiaotong Fei’s framework, which has been most widely adopted by sin-
ologists to characterize the general pattern of Chinese social relations
(Hamilton 1996; Bian 1997; Zhao 1998; Peng 2004). According to Fei
([1948] 1992), the general pattern of Chinese social relations is character-
ized as a “differential mode of association.” It is analogized as the circles
that appear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown into it. In
other words, the Chinese guanxi are structured in a nested concentric
pattern with the Ego in the center. Layers of concentric circles extending
from the center represent different categories of relations to the Ego in a
descending order of intimacy. The degree of closeness and intimacy spec-
ifies the degree of trustworthiness, intensity of sentiment, and type of
obligation. The concentric and hierarchical character of Chinese guanxi
is indicated by the quarters of circles in figure 2.
Second, I draw on David Wank’s categorization of Chinese guanxi.
According to Wank (1996), the degree of intimacy in Chinese guanxi
descends from those that are ascribed to acquired personal relations and
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Fig. 2.—The pattern and categories of Chinese guanxi and their relational properties.
The star scores in certain cells deviate from those in figure 1 since they represent the intensity
of the relational properties in Chinese guanxi as opposed to the hypothetical model.
finally to business relations. Ascribed relations are those produced by
birth. They are blood ties, or directly related kin. Acquired personal re-
lations refer to ties formed by shared experiences prior to any business
exchanges. Business relations are those personal ties forged after the onset
of deals for commercial ends. Despite the argument that postreform China
has been shifting from a group-based to a network-based society (Gold
1989; Lin 2001), kinship continues to play a particularly important role
in Chinese business practices (Peng 2004). In contrast to Wellman and
Wortley’s (1990) findings that extended kin in Canadian communities are
the least likely of all network members to provide social or financial
support, the extended kin in Chinese societies are often the source of
financial support that is provided on the basis of need.6 Therefore, blood
6 For example, it has been common for people who live in a more affluent region, say
Hong Kong, to send remittances to distant relatives in mainland China, including those
whom they rarely see or have never met, to fulfill the asymmetric obligation of the
proverb “blood is thicker than water.” I observed these situations in Hong Kong from
the 1970s to the early 2000s.
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ties in the Chinese guanxi hierarchy often belong to the strong tie category
even though contacts between members may be infrequent. Acquired
personal relations can be as intimate as ascribed relations if they are
spousal relations or are characterized as fictive kin (Peng 2004). The hi-
erarchical order of ascribed, acquired personal, and business relations in
terms of their closeness to the Ego is shown in figure 2. The dotted arrow
extending from business relations denotes the possibility of turning busi-
ness relations into personal friends, and yet they are still different from
those friends acquired prior to business exchanges.
Finally, to characterize the intensity of the relational properties in dif-
ferent tie strengths, figure 2 indicates that the level of trust and affection
and the demand for asymmetric obligation in Chinese strong ties are more
intense than that in the hypothetical model. However, trust, affection,
and asymmetric obligation in Chinese weak ties or arm’s-length ties are
relatively low. Lin (2001) proposes that asymmetric obligation is the most
distinct component characterizing Chinese social relations. He observes
that it is the asymmetric transaction that makes a relation special and
qualified to be what the Chinese refer to as guanxi. Lin’s insights are
shared by Hwang (1987), who suggests that close ties in Chinese societies
operate according to the principle of need, whereas the principle of equity
applies only to distant and impersonal ties. As asymmetric obligation is
such a crucial element for distinguishing the closeness of a relation, weak
ties have very little of this property. The same logic applies to trust and
affection. The family- and kin-centered character of Chinese social re-
lations (Fei 1992; Kao 1996; Wank 1996; Hamilton 1998) gives ascribed
social circles and fictive kin friends the privilege of sharing an extraor-
dinary level of trust and affection. In addition, institutional trust in Chi-
nese contexts is found to be embedded in personal trust (Hamilton 1985;
Wong 1996; Tang 2005). Therefore, the highly hierarchical distinction
between close ties and strangers designates weak ties as relatively low
levels of trust and affection.
The projection from the analytic frame in the previous section on the
relation between tie strengths and economic transactions can be largely
applied to the Chinese case for life insurance sales. What might be dis-
tinctive about the Chinese case is that since asymmetric obligation renders
a rich symbolic meaning that qualifies the specialty of a guanxi, this
element is expected to play an especially critical role in the dynamics of
mobilizing and constructing guanxi for economic transactions. Moreover,
since blood ties enjoy a special privilege in demanding asymmetric ob-
ligation and a taken-for-granted status in trust, the dramaturgical per-
formances in ties with midrange and weak strengths are expected to go
in the direction of forging fictive kin.
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ETHNOGRAPHIC METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION
This article is derived from a study on the making of a life insurance
market in urban China. I conducted more than 14 months of ethnographic
research in Shanghai between 2000 and 2004, collecting data in three
stages. The initial stage took place in the summer of 2000. On the basis
of these findings, I selected four life insurance companies representing a
wide variety for a subsequent year-long field study during 2001–2 and a
follow-up study in the winter of 2004. These companies included a wholly
foreign-owned American insurer, AIA; a local insurer that had experienced
dramatic growth, Ping An Life Insurance Company of China Limited
(Ping An); a seemingly very localized Sino-American joint venture, Pacific-
Aetna Life Insurance Company Limited (Pacific-Aetna); and an appar-
ently less localized Sino-German joint venture, Allianz-Dazhong Life In-
surance Company Limited (Allianz-Dazhong).
Data were collected through formal and informal interviews, partici-
pant observations, and questionnaires and by referencing public docu-
ments and insurers’ publications. I conducted participant observations in
the agency offices of each selected insurer for two to three months, at-
tending training sessions for the agents, joining in morning assemblies,
and participating in small group meetings on a regular basis. With the
consent of certain agents, I went with them to search for potential buyers,
to sell products, and to visit existing clients.7 From 2000 to 2004, I observed
46 morning assemblies, 48 small group meetings or gatherings, 28 training
sessions, and 43 occasions of agent-client or agent-prospect interactions.
A total of 99 sales agents, 44 managerial staff, 96 clients, and 35 prospects
in Shanghai were interviewed (see App. table A1 for the profiles of the
interviewees). The observations and interviews were supplemented with
179 nonrandom sampled questionnaires (66 from sales agents, 63 from
clients, and 50 from prospects).8 In addition, I interviewed a total of 13
insurance practitioners in Beijing to assess the generalizability of the
Shanghai case to urban China.
7 One limitation of this method was that sales agents were typically reluctant to bring
me along when visiting resistant prospects. One agent explicitly said to me that he
would feel uneasy using certain strategic sales discourses in my presence. Fortunately,
the sales agents shared their stories of dealing with difficult prospects in morning
assemblies, group meetings, and training sessions. Although retrospective cognitive
processes were involved when they recounted their interactions with the prospects,
listening to a number of stories told by different sales agents is a valid and reliable
method of obtaining data that are inaccessible to direct observation.
8 For the sales agents, I distributed the questionnaires to nine different agency offices,
including companies other than the four where I conducted participant observations.
For the clients and prospects, I distributed the questionnaires to employees of nine
different workplaces. The questionnaire respondents do not overlap with the inter-
viewees.
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As the competition among the insurers was very intense during my
research period, I made a conscious decision not to tape interviews with
sales agents and managerial staff in order to facilitate the greatest degree
of honesty. I asked their consent to let me note dates, figures, and names
that they mentioned for accuracy purposes. As for clients and prospects,
about half of the interviews were tape-recorded with consent. The data
analysis was an ongoing process along with the data collection. In iden-
tifying “typicality” (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006), for example, the “typ-
ical” marketing strategies deployed by sales agents, the “typical” motives
for clients’ purchase of life insurance, and the “typical” interactions be-
tween agents and prospects, I mostly counted the frequency of reported
and observed occurrences. Nonetheless, part of the analytical insights
come from rare events, such as agents’ occasional conflicts with the pros-
pects and clients’ complaints about the agents. In addition to my partic-
ipant observation and interview data, I made extensive use of insurance
yearbooks, newspapers, magazines, and insurers’ publications and train-
ing materials. These documents provided historical information about
insurance sales practices and changes they had undergone since the arrival
of AIA. Moreover, the oral histories of my interviewees and the community
memories of my informants also provided rich historical data. The his-
torical information provided by certain interviewees and informants (e.g.,
senior managers, senior sales agents, and former insurance practitioners
who had already left the industry) was given more weight than infor-
mation presented by casual observers.
SOCIALLY EMBEDDED TRANSACTIONS IN DIFFERENT TIE
STRENGTHS
The ethnographic data demonstrate that life insurance transactions in
China are remarkably socially embedded, and they are embedded in dif-
ferent forms. Three distinguishable forms of embedded transactions were
observed, which I call reflexive trust, obligatory, and personage trans-
actions. Reflexive trust transactions refer to life insurance purchases
driven primarily by an extremely strong sense of trust, as a reaction to
cultural schemas of intimate relationships without forethought. This kind
of transaction took place only among strong ties (circles 1 and 2 in fig.
2). Obligatory transactions refer to life insurance purchases driven mainly
by the norm of reciprocity, the etiquette of renqing. This kind of trans-
action took place mostly among strong ties but also among ties with
midrange strength (circles 1–4 in fig. 2). Personage transactions refer to
life insurance purchases attributed to the agents’ personal attraction and
likability. This type of transaction took place among ties with midrange
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or weak strength (circles 4–6 in fig. 2). What is intriguing is that each of
these embedded transactions was prevalent at a specific time, and each
shift took place with a critical condition changed. Reflexive trust trans-
actions were common at the very beginning when life insurance was an
unknown commodity to the public. This form of transaction gave way
to obligatory transactions when the commodity was somewhat known
but unwanted. The popularity of obligatory transactions lasted for a while
but was replaced by personage transactions when sales agents’ commis-
sion sales system was made public. After the disclosure of the commission
system, strong ties became a no-go zone for life insurance sales. In this
section, I analyze how each form of embedded transaction is actualized
by the relational properties that constitute tie strengths and why changes
took place. This account will reveal the critical role of culture, meaning,
and symbolic interaction in each of these embedded transactions and their
dynamical shifts from one to another.
Reflexive Trust Transactions among Strong Ties
Buying insurance is an “unconsummated” transaction at the time of ex-
change. Trust is always the issue for this kind of intertemporal monetary
transaction (Carruthers 2005). The mysterious terminology used in an
insurance contract further perplexes and intimidates first-time buyers.
Buying life insurance, thus, is itself a risk-taking activity. When AIA
arrived in Shanghai in late 1992, it faced a population with no idea what
life insurance was. This foreign insurer offered traditional risk manage-
ment products and trained its Chinese sales agents to raise people’s sense
of risk and teach them the protective functions of life insurance. However,
as premature death was a taboo topic for the Chinese, the agents found
it extremely difficult to talk about it (Chan, in press). In fact, many agents
themselves did not fully understand the concept of life insurance and the
risk management logic of this commodity. They were repeatedly told by
AIA’s chief trainer, a Chinese British man who grew up in England, that
life insurance was about familial love, family responsibility, security, re-
spect, dignity, and benefiting society. They were taught to believe that
selling life insurance was selling love and security, that selling life insur-
ance was about helping people, not simply about making money off of
them. In other words, insurers strove to sacralize this new commodity, so
as to remove the new agents’ “psychological barriers” to selling this com-
modity to their strong ties who had unwavering trust in them (Chan 2007).
However, not all agents were receptive to the idea of selling a mysterious
commodity to their relatives and close friends. Many of them soon left
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the industry, and some of them struggled to sell to strangers.9 Yet, a
proportion of them came to believe that life insurance did serve a phil-
anthropic function, and so they approached their intimate social circles
to sell them this new commodity. These agents internalized AIA’s indoc-
trination that they should bear the guilt if their close friends or relatives
suffered from misfortunes without insurance coverage simply because they
did not introduce this protection to them.
The agents who approached their relatives and close friends were gen-
erally successful because the problem of trust regarding life insurance as
an unknown commodity was suspended by the cultural schemas of in-
timate relationships. As defined by DiMaggio (1997), schemas are both
representations of knowledge and mechanisms for information processing.
They simplify cognition and promote efficiency at the expense of absolute
accuracy. The cultural schemas of “close friends and relatives” provide
cognitive shortcuts to simplify the interpretations of the motives and be-
haviors of people in this category. They generate positive expectations in
the face of uncertainty and facilitate decision making in unanticipated
circumstances.
Among the clients interviewed, about one-fourth bought their first pol-
icy in or before 1995. More than 80% of these clients reported that they
“had no idea what life insurance was” at that time. Then what made
them purchase their first policy? Deng Lili (age 46), a client who bought
a policy from AIA in 1995, recounted her purchase:10 “To be frank, I
didn’t know what I’d bought. Xiao (Junior) Zhen is my good friend.11
We’ve known each other for more than 10 years. I didn’t know much
about insurance. She called me one day and told me that she was working
for AIA. I had heard of AIA. Some of its agents had come to our residence
talking about insurance . . . and I was not interested at all. But xiao
Zhen is my close friend. She told me that insurance was good. If she
thought that it was good for me, I thought it must not be bad” (interview,
Shanghai, August 2002). The trust Deng had in the insurance agent was
based on heuristic processing rather than calculation. Uzzi (1997) specifies
trust in embedded ties as heuristic based, that is, “a predilection to assume
the best when interpreting another’s motives and actions” (p. 43). Building
on this insight and going one step further, I propose that heuristic-based
9 These early struggles were described to me in interviews with the senior sales agents
who joined AIA in 1992–93.
10 To protect the anonymity of the informants, I use pseudonyms throughout the text.
I follow Chinese practice that puts the surname before the given name.
11 When person A adds the word xiao or lao to the last name of person B, it means
that person A regards person B as quite a close friend. Xiao, which means “junior,”
is used when person B is younger than or about the same age as person A; lao, which
means “senior,” is used when person B is older than person A.
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trust, or the inclination to interpret the other party’s motives in a positive
light, is realized through a set of cultural schemas that define a close
friendship or an intimate relationship. Examples of these schemas are “a
close friend will not cheat me,” “a close friend will not sell something bad
to me,” and “a close friend cares about my interests.” Channeled by these
cultural schemas, Deng interpreted the agent’s motives in an altruistic
flavor when the agent was her close friend. Through trusting the agent,
Deng came to trust in the product the agent was selling.
Reflexive trust transactions largely took place when the general public
in Shanghai was ignorant of what life insurance was, and there were no
or very few regulations governing the market behaviors of the sellers or
protecting the interests of the buyers. In this highly uncertain condition,
the cultural schemas of intimate relationships facilitated life insurance
transactions that required an extraordinarily high level of trust. None-
theless, the critical condition for the cultural schemas of intimate rela-
tionships to be activated was that the buyers not be aware of the com-
mission sales system or the fact that part of the premiums they paid
directly went to the agents. As we will see in a later section, keeping the
commission system covert was necessary for buyers to interpret the agents’
motives as altruistic.
Obligatory Transactions among Strong to Moderate Ties
The period of relying on reflexive trust for transactions did not last long.
Soon after the public learned that life insurance carried the inherent risk
that the money they paid might not be returned if no misfortunes hap-
pened to them, they were much less interested in this new commodity.
The “unknown commodity” turned out to be an “unwanted commodity.”
In response to this local resistance, AIA strove to educate the public about
the risk management functions of life insurance. But the newly emerging
domestic insurance company, Ping An, redefined life insurance as money
management and offered products that served primarily a savings func-
tion to avoid the taboo topic of death. However, the interest rates offered
on these savings products were not competitive enough to appeal to the
general public. So, neither AIA products nor Ping An products were
appealing. How could the agents sell them?
The answer is the etiquette of renqing. Etiquette embodies a set of
customs and rules that define socially acceptable and appropriate behav-
iors. It sanctions behaviors via widely diffused norms, and such norms
create culturally specific expectations on others (Zukin and DiMaggio
1990; Nee and Ingram 1998). Renqing, loosely translated as “interpersonal
obligations,” by definition involves a giving and a receiving party such
that the receiving party owes the giving party an obligation. Thus, the
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enactment of renqing is always asymmetric. The etiquette of renqing com-
mands that members of good relationships should enact asymmetric ob-
ligations to each other. It demands that members offer sympathies, af-
fections, face, and favors to those who are in need for the sake of
reproducing and strengthening the relationships.
Buying a life insurance policy in order to observe the etiquette of renqing
was very popular in the mid-1990s. The local people described the life
insurance market in this early phase as “a market of renqing baodan” to
characterize the fact that most transactions were driven by interpersonal
obligations, or renqing. Three different forms of obligatory transactions
driven by three different manifestations of renqing can be identified,
namely, sympathetic-affective, face-giving, and indebted transactions.
Sympathetic-affective transactions.—Zhao Anpei (age 38) and Wei Jing-
gang (age 43) had been coworkers in a state-owned factory, and they
considered each other very close friends even after they left the factory.
Zhao was a single mother with an 8-year-old daughter. Wei was sym-
pathetic to her situation as a single mother and as the breadwinner of
her family. Being a new agent, Zhao at first felt uneasy approaching her
intimate social circles. However, when she failed to meet the sales quota
during her probation period, she approached Wei and simply told him
that she needed to meet a sales quota. Without hesitation, Wei bought a
policy from her. “Xiao Zhao and I have been very good friends for more
than twenty years. I always regard her as my younger sister. . . . I bought
a policy from her as I wanted to help her. You know, it’s tough to be a
sales agent . . . [but] I actually didn’t know what I bought. I don’t really
care about the product. I just wanted to help her” (interview, Shanghai,
August 2000).
Social psychologists have long discussed how emotions matter in the
reproduction of social relations (Lawler and Yoon 1998; Lawler 2001).
The affective element in strong ties is often an influential force that mo-
tivates favor delivery (Krackhardt 1992). In the above example, Wei re-
garded Zhao as his fictive kin, and it was this affective bond that drove
him to buy an insurance policy from her. Wei’s primary motive was to
help the agent rather than to gain benefit from the insurance policy.
Transactions primarily driven by sympathies and affection occur only
among strong ties (circles 1 and 2 in fig. 2).
Face-giving transactions.—Although the Chinese concept of “face” has
multiple meanings in different contexts, Goffman (1967, pp. 5–12) has
provided generalized definitions of “face” and “face giving” that are de-
rived from Chinese usage. Accordingly, “face” can be defined as the socially
approved and positively evaluated attributes a person claims for himself
by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. “Face
giving” refers to arranging a better line for a person or a group of persons
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than the person or the group might otherwise have been able to take. If
someone “loses face,” the person loses social standing in the opinion of
known or knowable social circles (Hertz 2001). Mobilizing the norm of
face giving was a very common practice among the Chinese sales agents.
However, as rendering face and favor in Chinese relations is not random,
but instead follows a concentric and hierarchical structure, asking for face
and favor requires competent cultural knowledge and dramaturgical
skills. The following example is illustrative of this point.
Cai Xiaojin (age 25) is a nephew of Hu Jiao (about age 45). Being a
new agent of Ping An, Cai visited Hu three times in two months. During
his visits, he never explicitly suggested to his uncle that he buy a policy.
In his last visit, he skillfully used his mother as a resource to ask for face
giving. “My mom is happy that I’ve taken up this new job [of insurance
sales]. . . . She believes that being an agent is meaningful, because you
are bringing something important to someone you care for.”12
Because Cai’s mother is an elder sister of Hu, she customarily com-
mands his respect. However, because Cai is younger than Hu, he has
relatively less authority to request face. To play it safe, Cai used his mother
to ask for face. When he said that his mom viewed selling insurance as
a meaningful and important mission, he was subtly asking his uncle to
give face not only to him but to his mother. Hu had already bought a
policy from AIA and did not feel that he needed another one from Ping
An. Nevertheless, he bought a policy from Cai because, he said, “Cai is
my nephew. It’s hard to say ‘no’ to him. You know, he is my nephew. I
need to give him and my sister a bit of face. I wouldn’t have bought any
if he weren’t my nephew” (interview, Shanghai, October 2001). In return,
Cai offered a discount on the premium of the policy. Hu continued: “When
I gave him [Cai] the money, he said I only had to give him half of the
amount. He said he would pay for the other half of the first month’s
premium. . . . He said, ‘You are my uncle. I should give you a special
offer.’ I told him that he didn’t have to do so. But he insisted” (October
2001). This exchange of favors—one party giving face and the other party
giving a small amount of monetary or material return—is instrumental
in maintaining and strengthening the preexisting relationship. I should
note that the discount on the premium was offered not to induce the
purchase since it was made after Hu already agreed to buy. Hu’s purchase
was based on face giving, a normative conformity enacting the interper-
sonal obligation that defines the significance of a relationship. Likewise,
Cai’s offer of a discount served to express the unique quality of the
relationship. A refusal from either party to conform to these norms would
12 This quotation is from an interview with Hu Jian (October 2001), who paraphrased
what Cai Xiaojin said to him.
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not only elicit embarrassing or apologetic feelings (Elster 1989) but also
demean the significance of the relationship.
The enforcing power of face is highest in those relationships in which
both parties could end the relationship but have less flexibility and free-
dom to do so. Relatives belong to this category. Friends who share some
common interests and social circles, and whose interests and reputations
would be at stake if the friendships ended, are also more likely to give
face to each other. Face-giving transactions take place in relationships
that are defined more by an asymmetric obligation than a symmetric one
(circles 2 and 3 in fig. 2).13
Indebted transactions.—In both sympathetic-affective and face-giving
transactions, the buyers are the parties who deliver asymmetric obligations
to the agents in the first place. Some agents then offered discounts or
presented gifts in return. Another form of obligatory transaction begins
with the agents’ provision of favors to their prospects. After receiving the
favors, the prospects feel indebted to the agents. In other words, the agents
first perform asymmetric obligations to the prospects to earn obligatory
credits. The credit slips (Coleman 1988) often induce purchase from the
prospects as a way of repaying the favor to the agents.
Li Fei (mid-30s) and Yang Ji (mid-30s) were colleagues until Yang left
to become an insurance agent for AIA. Li soon bought two insurance
policies from Yang. When asked what made him buy life insurance, he
said that “the agent xiao Yang is my ex-colleague. He’s a very helpful
and nice person. Once he did me a big favor by helping my son to get
into the high school that we liked. . . . I always felt indebted to him.
. . . This time he came to sell insurance. I didn’t care much about in-
surance. But it’s okay to buy some from him. . . . This is like a way of
returning him a favor” (interview, Shanghai, April 2002). This case dem-
onstrates that the primary driving force for the transaction was Li’s sense
of indebtedness to Yang. Offering help to former colleagues, schoolmates,
friends, and existing clients in order to create a sense of indebtedness to
induce purchase has been a common practice of Chinese sales agents.
However, some agents are more successful than others in bringing forth
indebted transactions. Those who behave as though they offer help with-
out a sales agenda are more effective in orchestrating indebted feelings
from the prospects. In the above case, Li attributed Yang’s helpful be-
havior to being a “helpful and nice person” rather than to the intention
of selling him insurance. Therefore, the dramaturgical gestures and per-
formances of the sellers to a large extent affect the outcome. Indebted
13 Face-giving transactions rarely occurred in the strongest ties (circle 1 in fig. 2) because
the very intimate relationships, such as parent-child, spousal, and sibling relationships,
are maintained and strengthened more through affective than face exchanges.
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transactions typically occur in midrange tie strength, in which asymmetric
favors offered by one party are soon to be returned by the receiving party
in a different kind (circles 3 and 4 in fig. 2).
Strong Ties Became a No-Go Zone
Obligatory transactions, which are primarily driven by relational bonds,
were most prevalent in 1995–96, when virtually all life insurance products
had little appeal. Between 1997 and 1999, transactions took place in all
tie strengths, from very strong to arm’s-length, as life insurance products
became more appealing. Since mid-1996, there have been seven consec-
utive interest rate cuts in China. In order to capture the life insurance
market, Ping An and other domestic insurers did not adjust their products’
guaranteed interest rates accordingly, making their products competitive
savings plans (Chan 2009). When the products were attractive, there was
no need to rely only on the etiquette of renqing to sell, though selling to
those in strong ties was still common. Toward the end of 1999, however,
embedded transactions in relation to tie strengths took a new twist. Strong
ties became a constraint on life insurance sales. When I was in the field,
I observed that insurance agents often felt ambivalent about approaching
their existing good friends and relatives. Selling to close intimates became
undesirable and negatively labeled as “unprofessional.” Instead, the agents
made a great effort to build friendship or fictive kinship with “not-too-
close” friends, distant acquaintances, and referred prospects. Why did this
shift occur toward the end of 1999?
Three contextual changes were observed at the time when insurance
agents began to refrain from approaching close intimates for insurance
sales. The first change supports Guthrie’s argument that the rational-legal
model has been gaining importance. The official regulatory body, the
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), was established in 1998.
This authority formulated and enforced insurance law and regulations,
overseeing insurance business operations, protecting the interests of pol-
icyholders, and maintaining order within the market. As the market be-
came relatively regulated, the public’s generalized trust in the insurance
industry gradually increased. This led to a decrease in reliance on reflexive
trust that is found only in intimate guanxi.
However, increasing institutionalization cannot fully explain the sudden
shift of the target groups from strong to weak ties. Despite the increasing
regulations on the market, life insurance and insurance sales agents did
not enjoy a favorable public image. This constituted a second contextual
factor that discouraged transactions in close personal relations. The idea
that life insurance was a modern risk management mechanism was still
not widely accepted after the establishment of the CIRC. In dealing with
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the public resistance, some insurance sales agents, especially those from
the domestic insurance firms, presented life insurance as a money man-
agement device and exaggerated the benefits of their products. As a result,
sales agents earned a pushy image and the life insurance companies ac-
quired a money-grubber image. The negative public image and low social
status of insurance agents deterred agents from approaching their close
friends and relatives for fear of losing face.
The negative image of insurance agents was intensified by a third con-
textual factor: the disclosure of the commission sales system to the public.
This disclosure, I argue, was the most critical factor that led to the sudden
shift of where transactions took place. Making a living based on com-
missions, a concept introduced by AIA, was new to the local population.14
Knowing that the local people might not accept this concept, insurers and
their agents tried to conceal their payment system.15 However, some agents
offered discounts to their prospects and unintentionally leaked bits and
pieces of information about the commission system. Such information was
then circulated by word of mouth. However, people still did not know
exactly how the commission system worked or the amount of commissions
the agents received. Toward the end of the 1990s, more life insurers joined
in the market and pushed the demand for sales agents. They dramatically
exaggerated the income of insurance agents in recruitment advertisements
in the most widely read local press in order to recruit aggressive and
ambitious agents. They not only made transparent how the commission
system worked but created rumors that many insurance agents had made
a fortune. These advertisements changed people’s perception of the mo-
tives of their close friends or relatives who sold them insurance.
It was the cultural schemas of intimate relationships that framed the
prospects’ interpretations of the agents’ motives in a highly positive light.
When the commission sales system was made known, another line of
cultural schemas that defined commercial-oriented sales set in. Schemas
such as “commercial sales are profit oriented,” “commercial sales are de-
signed to make money,” and “commercial sales exaggerate the value of a
product” are in conflict with the ethical-affective definition of intimate
relationships. A person can be profit oriented, but she or he should not
apply this orientation to good friends and relatives. Some of the clients
who previously did not know about the commission system felt cheated.
14 There were sales jobs in state-owned enterprises before the marketization of the
economy, but salespersons received fixed salaries. If there were commissions, they were
understood as extra “bonuses” on top of salaries.
15 During my field research in 2000–2004, Ping An and China Life’s agents were not
given any printed information about the commission rates on the sales of different
products, fearing that the agents might accidentally disclose such information to their
clients.
This content downloaded from 147.8.31.43 on Mon, 25 Aug 2014 23:09:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Life Insurance Transactions in China
735
Ma Xiaojun (mid-40s) bought two policies from her good friend a few
years ago. Now she felt that her friend had taken money out of her pocket:
“When I bought these policies, I didn’t know what they were. I trusted
the agent. She’s one of my very good friends. . . . I just bought what she
recommended. . . . At that time, I didn’t know that she actually took 40
percent of the premiums I paid into her own pocket. . . . I was a bit
shocked, honestly. How should I put this . . . it’s fine that she was selling
insurance to make a living. But I don’t feel good when she’s making
money off of me” (interview, Shanghai, August 2002). Ma bought the
policy because of her reflexive trust in the agent. However, the disclosure
of the commission system was like an “inopportune intrusion” that exposed
the backstage of the agent’s performance (Goffman 1959, p. 209). Since
reflexive trust is grounded in the cultural schemas of intimate relation-
ships, the exposure of the economic gains of one party in this relationship
breaks the foundation of the trust (Molm et al. 2000). The disclosure of
the commission system not only changed the prospects’ perception and
interpretation of the sales agents’ motives but also changed the symbolic
meanings of agents’ behaviors and affected the feelings and self-image of
the agents when they approached their close friends. When it became
transparent that agents lived on commissions, the agents felt as though,
in their words, they were “begging for money” when selling insurance to
their close friends and relatives. Meanwhile, they worried that the com-
missions would become an issue that ruined their preexisting strong ties.
Thus, the agents actively withdrew from approaching their intimate cir-
cles. The agents, under the pressure to sell, initially violated the cultural
rules on which reflexive trust was based. However, such violations were
not sustainable in the long run.16
Selling to close friends and relatives, nonetheless, is not entirely im-
possible. It is possible if the agents are willing to offer discounts with
rates comparable to the commission rates they would receive. In this way,
they are no longer selling for economic gains. Chang Pingkai, a young
16 Thanks to a reviewer who insightfully pointed out that by selling to their intimate
circles without revealing the economic gains behind the sale, the insurance agents
indeed violated cultural expectations to exploit their strong ties. The reviewer inter-
preted this violation as an indicator of economic interests overriding the cultural rules
of relational embeddedness, and that the cultural rules were not doing much work. I
maintain that the binding force of the cultural rules was working; otherwise, the agents
would not have had “psychological barriers” to selling to their strong ties initially; nor
would they have avoided approaching their close ties once the commissions were made
public. Some of their close friends and relatives would still be likely to observe (though
reluctantly) the etiquette of renqing and buy a policy from them if the agents kept
approaching them. The agents’ active and instant withdrawal was driven less by
economic calculation than by their concern about the meanings of their behaviors in
the eyes of their strong ties.
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insurance agent of a domestic insurer, described how his relatives were
demanding asymmetric exchanges from him: “[The recruitment adver-
tisements] posted that insurance agents could earn one million in five
years. This is a lie. . . . But my clients called me after they saw the ads.
They said I had made a fortune. . . . Some of them, mostly my relatives,
asked if they could get some rebates [huikou]. It was very embarrassing.
Even if they didn’t ask me for that, they knew that I got 40 percent of
the premiums they paid. This made me feel embarrassed and uncom-
fortable” (interview, Shanghai, September 2000). The request for rebates
by Chang’s relatives is less about exploiting their guanxi with Chang and
more about negotiating the meanings (Fine 1996) of their guanxi. When
an agent sells a product to a close intimate, the agent’s willingness to cut
the price, and by how much, carries an evaluative statement on the re-
lationship. The more the agent is willing to cut the price, the more it
signifies the importance of the bond. Nonetheless, fulfilling the symbolic
and expressive demand for asymmetric exchanges is economically costly
to the agents. After all, the agents were living on commissions. Not to
fulfill such a demand, however, would be socially and emotionally costly.
When the agents are perceived as putting their economic interests over
the relationship, it not only hurts the agents’ relations with friends and
relatives involved in the transaction but hurts the “face” of the agents
and ruins their social reputation (Raub and Weesie 1990). Some agents
reported that they felt so uncomfortable after selling to close friends and
relatives that they used the commissions to buy gifts for these clients.
Thus, the conflict between ethically-affectively defined close personal re-
lationships and commercial-oriented sales, together with the expectation
of asymmetric exchanges in these relationships, ultimately make circles 1
and 2 in figure 2 a problematic relational zone for life insurance sales.
Personage Transactions among Moderate to Weak Ties
Approaching moderately to loosely connected or referred social contacts
became a more “respectable” or “professional” way of selling in the early
2000s. The moderately to loosely connected preexisting social ties (circles
4 and 5 in fig. 2) are best understood as laiwang (keeping in touch) circles
in the Chinese concept. An agent of AIA explained why laiwang friends
are better prospects than close friends or relatives: “I don’t sell to my
relatives or close friends. . . . Selling to former schoolmates and neighbors
is better. Why? . . . They have a certain degree of trust in me. But they
are not my close friends. When I approach them for business, I can interact
with them in a business-like way” (interview, Shanghai, January 2002).
Laiwang circles are better target groups for insurance sales for both their
structural and relational qualities. The structural embeddedness literature
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has provided us with insights on why moderate to weak ties are struc-
turally better for various economic exchanges, so I will not repeat them
here. What I would like to emphasize is the relational advantages enjoyed
by these ties. While intimate relations are defined more by affection and
obligation, laiwang relations are defined by courtesy and immediate rec-
iprocity. They are governed by a mix of ethical-affective and instrumental-
monetary principles and constituted by a relatively balanced composition
of trust, affection, obligation, and calculation. A laiwang relationship bears
a higher degree of freedom to let economic interests intermingle with
personal interactions without violating the definition of the relationship.
Calculating one’s economic interests in an exchange with a laiwang friend
is more legitimate than doing so with a close friend. At the same time,
both parties in a laiwang relationship have some sense of trust in each
other. For the agents, they have some space to express their self-interest,
and it requires less effort to deal with the problem of trust. Moreover,
the prospects are less likely to expect a discount in price in a laiwang
relationship that contains relatively balanced obligations. For the pros-
pects, they are under a lesser degree of obligation to buy from the agents.
They feel more comfortable asking questions and expressing concerns
about the products. Thus, this kind of relation provides more space for
buyers and sellers to move in and out of transactions and to test each
other’s credibility in order to protect their economic interests.
However, unlike the prospects in intimate relations, the prospects in
laiwang relations are under less obligatory pressure to buy from a par-
ticular agent. They first have to feel a certain sense of need for life in-
surance. A sales agent first has to frame life insurance as money man-
agement so as to make it more acceptable to the local people (Chan 2009).
Next, the agent has to compete with other sales agents for closing a deal.
What makes a prospect buy from one agent over another is often attrib-
uted to the personal qualities of the agents and how much the prospect
likes the agent, which can be conceived of as a “personage transaction.”
This form of transaction is neither purely economic nor primarily rela-
tional but a mix of both. The purchase is based on a certain sense of need
for insurance but is noncommittal, and from whom the prospects purchase
depends on which agents they personally like. In China, the most effective
way of being a likable person is what the agents call “affective investment”
(ganqing touzi). The most common cultural resources that the insurance
agents mobilized are the etiquette of renqing and the bonds of kinship.
Their strategies are to actively offer asymmetric favors to induce in-
debtedness and to relate to the prospects as though they were fictive kin.
The following two examples are illustrative of these practices.
A filial daughter-in-law.—Chang Qing (age 27), an agent of Ping An,
was relatively new but was making good progress in her sales perfor-
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mance. The following episode reveals how she strengthened her relation-
ship with a client for referrals:
On the birthday of one of her clients, Chang took her 3-year-old son with
her and taught him a Chinese blessing, “wishing you health and to live a
hundred years,” to say to her client, Wang Chun. She bought a scarf that
cost 10 yuan [US$1.20] as a birthday gift and arrived at Wang’s residence
early in the morning. Wang, aged over 50 and suffering from a deformed
leg, was very moved when she saw the agent and the little boy. The boy
was barely able to say “wishing you health.” Wang bent her waist to reach
the boy’s face to show affection. . . . She was very touched by what Chang
had been doing. Chang had visited her just two weeks before on Women’s
Day and gave her a carnation. Wang felt much indebted to her kindness.
She went to her bedroom for a few minutes and came out with tears in
her eyes. She walked over to the boy and put a note of 100 yuan [US$12]
into his pocket. . . . During their chat, Wang told Chang that the last wish
in her life was finding a wife for her 25-year-old son. She said if she could
have a daughter-in-law like Chang, she could be at ease for the rest of her
life.17
Wang, in an interview with this author, compared her feelings about
Chang to her feelings about other agents who had approached her. She
was approached by altogether four different agents, who all knocked on
her door without appointments. She was impressed by two of them: an
agent from Aetna and Chang. When they first met with her, each chatted
with her for almost an hour without even mentioning insurance. She liked
their nonpushing and caring attitude. Chang finally won her over, Wang
recalled, because she sent her a greeting card with warm wishes and
phoned her during the Lunar New Year. The agent from Aetna also called
her once to show concern, but she felt that Chang was more sincere and
cared about her more. She felt that Chang could be a real friend (interview,
Shanghai, April 2002). To orchestrate an indebted feeling from Wang,
Chang did treat her as though she was her kin. She bought her gifts and
visited her on festivals. She mobilized her son to participate in the dram-
aturgical stage. By getting her little boy involved, Chang effectively elic-
ited not only an indebted feeling but also a familial sentiment from Wang,
who then wished Chang to be her daughter-in-law. With this fictive kin
bond, Wang not only referred her relatives and neighbors to Chang but
went one step further to help convince them of the importance of in-
surance.
A naive sister.—Zhang Ying (age 24) was one of the top sales agents
of Allianz-Dazhong. The selling strategy Zhang often used was to present
17 The agent, Chang, shared with other agents her experience in establishing guanxi
with clients and prospects in a morning assembly in an agency office of Ping An in
April 2002.
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herself as a naive girl in front of the prospects to establish sibling-like
relationships with them. The following extract of my field notes describes
how Zhang successfully sold a “big policy” to an existing client.
Zhang got to know Hang through her father who once had a business deal
with him. For more than a year Zhang was trying to sell a bigger policy
to Hang. She was not able to close the sale because Hang’s wife, whom
Zhang called sister Li Yun, was reluctant to buy from her. . . . When she
learned that Li was pregnant, she bought a book called “How to Raise
Your Lovely Baby” and sent it to her along with a greeting card. . . . After
the baby was born, Zhang bought a can of formula and a bunch of lilies
as gifts for Li and the baby. She also brought a “big policy” proposal with
her and presented it to the couple. . . . Sometimes Zhang simply put on a
pitiful face when her client became too critical of the proposal. . . .
Before she left, Zhang deliberately walked over to the couple’s wed-
ding picture. She exclaimed in a naive tone, “Sister Li Yun, you are so
beautiful! . . .” [However], two days later, Zhang received a call from the
headquarters, saying that Li Yun wanted to terminate her husband’s ex-
isting policy in Allianz-Dazhong. This made Zhang anxious and worried.
She called Hang, who then invited her over to his workplace the following
day. . . . She sat down and looked upset. Instead of talking about insurance,
she talked about her feelings: “Brother Ganzhi, is it true that sister Li Yun
doesn’t like me? Tell me the truth, please. . . . Did I do something wrong?
I felt hurt when I got the phone call from the headquarters that sister Li
Yun wanted to terminate the policy.” Hang comforted her, saying that he
was pleased with the proposal she presented. . . . He convinced his wife
to agree on a new purchase from Zhang. The annual premium was over
30,000 yuan [US$3,615].18
Zhang, who had a preexisting weak tie with Hang, had been making
a great effort to transform their relationship to a fictive kin tie by sending
gifts, acting as a caring and yet naive little sister, and talking about
personal feelings. Presenting herself as a caring person to his wife and as
a naive little sister to Hang was quite effective in soliciting Hang’s sym-
pathetic feelings for her. These feelings, together with his favoring the
policy Zhang presented, prompted him to convince his wife about the
purchase.
Mobilizing the etiquette of renqing together with the bonds of kinship
is a powerful way of making guanxi with clients and prospects in the
Chinese context. The Chinese sales agents tactfully capitalize on the norm
of reciprocity by actively presenting gifts and rendering favors to make
their clients and prospects feel indebted and obligated to repay their fa-
vors. “The Chinese are afraid of being cared for by someone. When some-
18 The agent, Zhang, shared her successful story with other agents in a small group
meeting in an agency office of Allianz-Dazhong in May 2002. The annual premium,
US$3,615, was 10 times more than the majority of the policies sold in Shanghai.
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one cares for them persistently, they feel indebted to that person,” a Ping
An agent said. The importance of repaying a favor, which is rooted in
the Confucian teachings of how to maintain social order, is stipulated in
the common aphorism lishang wanglai (gifts coming and returning). Fur-
thermore, the etiquette of renqing encourages returning more than what
you have received. It is expressed unmistakably in this Chinese aphorism:
nijingwoyichi, wojingniyizhang (you respect me for a foot, I respect you
for 10 feet).19 As a case in point, Chang’s client offered 100 yuan to the
little boy when Chang’s gifts, including both the scarf and the carnation,
cost much less. When the principle of repaying more than the amount
received is applied to the exchanges between sales agents and prospects
or clients, the repayment of favors from prospects or clients, more often
than not, is to buy a policy or refer someone to the agents.
ENCAPSULATION AND GENERALIZATION
The ethnographic data above, which are encapsulated in table 1, illustrate
different forms of embedded transactions in different tie strengths under
different conditions. Reflexive trust and obligatory transactions occurred
mostly among strong ties when the new commodity was either unknown
or unwanted by the public majority, market regulations had not yet been
established to protect the buyers, and the economic interests of the sellers
were covert. When the prospects had no or very little knowledge of the
new commodity, the cultural schemas of intimate relationships were ac-
tivated to suspend the problem of trust when sellers were close friends
or relatives. When the prospects came to know more about the new com-
modity but still did not have a sense of need for it, affection and the norm
of reciprocity, or the etiquette of renqing, constituted by endless cycles of
asymmetric obligations between members were mobilized to achieve the
sale. In both reflexive trust and obligatory transactions, sellers hid, down-
played, or moderated their economic interests and buyers engaged in the
purchase as reciprocal exchanges. When market regulations began to
emerge to protect life insurance clients, relying on the relational properties
that are found only in strong ties became less necessary. However, what
made strong ties a constraint on life insurance sales was the exposure of
the commission sales system to the public. Sales agents avoided selling
to strong ties precisely to preserve the significance of those ties. When
concentrating on selling to those moderately to loosely connected social
19 Zhang is a unit of length used by the Chinese for centuries until Communist China.
Yizhang refers to one zhang, which equals 3.33 meters. As one meter is approximately
three feet, I use 10 feet to represent one zhang, even though this representation may
not be perfect.
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TABLE 1
Summary of Different Forms of Socially Embedded Transactions
Embedded Transaction
Reflexive Trust Obligatory Personage
Where Very strong ties Very strong to mid-
range ties
Midrange to weak ties
When 1. Unknown products
2. Lack of market
regulations
3. Covert profit making
of sellers
1. Unwanted products
2. Lack of market
regulations
3. Covert profit making
of sellers
1. Somewhat wanted
products but
noncommittal
2. Some market
regulations
3. Overt profit making
of sellers
How Mobilizing the cultural
schemas of intimate
relationships by hid-
ing or moderating the
economic interests
Mobilizing affection
and the norm of reci-
procity by hiding,
downplaying, or
moderating the eco-
nomic interests
Making guanxi to boost
trust, affection, and
asymmetric
obligation
circles, they engaged themselves in a variety of dramaturgical interactions
with the prospects to inflate elements of trust, affection, and asymmetric
obligation that were relatively weak in their preexisting loose ties with
the prospects. They strove to build closer guanxi with the prospects in
order to compete against each other.
This article argues that strong ties are in general a less desirable re-
lational category for direct economic transactions. The ethical-affective
principle that defines intimate relationships and the high intensity of trust,
affection, and asymmetric obligation stands in conflict with economic
transactions that are defined by economic interests and calculations. Ties
with midrange to weak strength are the better category of social relations
for economic exchanges because of their relational complementarity,
namely, a relatively balanced composition of trust, affection, obligation,
and calculation. The trust and affective components lower the transaction
costs, and the symmetric obligation and calculation components allow
self-
interest-driven economic behaviors. Only under certain extreme institu-
tional or contingency conditions do economic transactions occur in strong
ties. In any case, transactions do not occur automatically even under the
favorable conditions. Dramaturgical interactions between sellers and buy-
ers are no less universal and important an integral part of social embed-
dedness. It is through interactions that the relational qualities of a dyad
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are not entirely fixed by their preexisting structural positions in a network,
and emergent structures (Ibarra 1992) are produced.
To what extent can the above analysis be generalized beyond the case
of life insurance in China? As I specified at the beginning, life insurance
belongs to a negotiated direct exchange that potentially carries a conflict
of interests between the parties involved (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer
2007). Life insurance transactions represent economic activities that in-
volve negotiations over prices and terms, and one party’s excessive gains
are another party’s losses. Most retailing, direct selling, trading, subcon-
tracting, and employment are negotiated economic exchanges. Strong ties
as a constraint on direct transactions can be generalized to these economic
activities across nations and cultures. A number of studies support this
claim. Jeffery’s (2001) ethnographic research on direct selling in China
notices that reliance on the close guanxi networks to build pyramids for
layered extraction of commissions was subject to general public distrust
and state condemnation. Moving beyond China, Velez-Ibanez’s (1983)
study of banking practices in Mexican communities reveals that making
profits among members of close ties is devalued because personalism,
which is highly valued in Mexican culture, is defined by trust and obli-
gation. In the United States, DiMaggio and Louch (1998) find that the
majority of the respondents in the 1996 General Social Survey agreed
that negotiating price was awkward and socially uneasy when trading
with friends. Aldrich and Sakano’s (1998) cross-national comparison of
personal business networks in Japan, the United States, Italy, Ireland,
and Sweden reports that only a small group of business associates in small
to medium-size firms are friends, and almost none are family members
in all the nations studied. All these case studies suggest that strong ties
are a less than ideal category of social relations for market-oriented eco-
nomic exchanges.
This generalization, however, has it limits. First, it does not apply to
economic activities in which the interests of the parties involved align
with each other. Strong ties are likely to be the preferred type of relations
for business partnerships (Kao 1996) and joint investments (Lee 1990;
Numazaki 1996). They are also preferred for non-profit-oriented economic
activities. The rotating credit association is an example of this kind (Big-
gart 2001). Second, the argument does not apply to economies that are
either closed or too small to have ties other than the strong category for
negotiated direct economic exchanges. Some immigrant or enclave econ-
omies belong to this category (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989). Finally,
as collateralized social relations serve as presumptive guarantees for man-
aging risky transactions (Biggart and Castanias 2001), strong ties are likely
to be where direct economic exchanges take place in a highly uncertain
environment. If the products or services in exchange are highly complex
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or if formal institutional protections are absent, trading partners are likely
to rely more on reflexive trust that is found only in strong ties (Guseva
2008).
The analytic frame developed for understanding the shift of life in-
surance transactions from strong to weak ties in China can be applied to
other social and cultural contexts for projecting what kinds of embedded
transactions are likely to take place in what ranges of tie strengths. The
two postulates—one that strong ties are defined by an ethical-affective
principle and constituted by trust, affection, and asymmetric obligation
and one that weak ties are defined by an instrumental-monetary principle
and constituted by symmetric obligation and calculation—can be gen-
eralized to non-Asian contexts. So can the proposal that dramaturgical
performances, especially on the part of the parties that seek exchanges,
are an integral part of the socially embedded transaction. Nevertheless,
the level of intensity of each relational property in different tie strengths
should be modified according to a specific time and locale when the an-
alytic frame is applied. For instance, in a highly institutionalized economy
with a high level of legal protection that generates a higher level of gen-
eralized trust, the level of trust in columns 5 and 6 of figure 1 will be
higher than that in the hypothetical model. In a Christian community in
which universal love is often invoked, the level of affection in weak ties
will be higher. In a highly individualistic society, asymmetric obligation
even in strong ties may be less intense than that in the hypothetical model.
Furthermore, as what counts as appropriate reciprocity varies across time
and space, dramaturgical interactions among actors vary from time to
time and from place to place. What remains universal is the direction of
intensity of various relational properties from the strongest to the weakest
ties and the need for strategic interactions in all tie strengths.
There are two aspects of the above analysis that might be distinctively
Chinese (or Asian). First, obligatory transactions might be more robust
in Chinese or Asian societies in which harmony is emphasized and hi-
erarchical relational order is a central social organizing principle (Ham-
ilton 1996). As the norm of reciprocity that is manifested by renqing is
“pervasive and dominant” in Chinese societies (Lin 2001), the enforcing
power of asymmetric obligation in economic exchanges among close in-
timates is likely to be more profound in Chinese societies. This feature
may also apply to some other Asian economies. For instance, the role of
obligation in enforcing market behaviors is found more salient in the
Japanese economy than in the Anglo-Saxon economies (Dore 1983; Lin-
coln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992). However, the stronger enforcing
power of the role of obligation in the Chinese and Japanese economies
does not negate its important role in other economies (Coleman 1988; Uzzi
and Lancaster 2003, 2004). Second, as kinship and native place collegiality
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in Chinese guanxi render more trust and asymmetric obligation among
members, the strategic interactions such as fictive kin are likely to be
found more salient in China than in other places. Interacting with pros-
pects as fictive kin is unlikely to be found in market economies in which
universalism and individualism are the norm. For instance, in opposition
to the Chinese insurance agents who extensively mobilized the norm of
reciprocity to act as fictive kin, Leidner (1993) finds that the social con-
vention of reciprocity is least employed by American insurance agents to
induce conformity. Instead, they use jokes to break the ice to create a
socially relaxing atmosphere for the subsequent economic negotiations.
Therefore, it is a universal demand on the parties seeking transactions to
enact dramaturgical performances in order to be likable (Oakes 1990;
Leidner 1993), but how to be likable is culturally and temporally specific.
CONCLUSION: CULTURE IN SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS
As DiMaggio (1992) points out, network analysis can never be purely
structural because the formal modeling of social relations is, in fact, based
on assumptions about cultural and subjective aspects of action. In his
words, when culture is “tossed out the front door, it returns through the
back” (p. 121). This article tackles at the front door the impacts of cultural
and subjective aspects of social relations on economic exchanges. It in-
corporates cultural sociology and symbolic interactionism into social em-
beddedness without posing culture and network in opposition to one other.
Despite Granovetter’s emphasis on trust and norms in organizing eco-
nomic activities, he, unfortunately, conceives the mechanism of cultural
rules in shaping human action as automatic, less reasonable responses to
situations (1985, p. 506). His worry about conceiving economic action as
a “cultural dupe” leaves the mechanism of culture in social network under-
theorized. I argue that emphasizing the role of culture does not have to
compromise the agency of the actors. The case of life insurance trans-
actions in China demonstrates that culture is constitutive of social em-
beddedness in many different manifestations, from cultural schemas to
normative rules, meanings, and a practical tool kit (Swidler 1986). Culture
manifests both as cultural rules that define, prescribe, and organize in-
teractions among members of different tie strengths according to their
structural positions and as repertoires that provide symbols and practical
skills for individual actors to creatively and effectively manipulate the
interactions for their interests. The socially embedded transactions pre-
sented in this article are culturally constituted, but they are neither random
nor automatic. Let me elaborate this point.
The extent to which business rationales and activities are morally le-
This content downloaded from 147.8.31.43 on Mon, 25 Aug 2014 23:09:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Life Insurance Transactions in China
745
gitimate in a preexisting personal relationship is subject to the primary
principle that defines the category of relation the particular relationship
belongs to. The defining principle is composed of cognitive and normative
cultural rules that specify how the actors in a specific category of relation
should interact to reproduce the relationship. The enforcing power of
cultural rules is exercised through meanings. Meanings distinguish the
interactions that follow the rules from those that violate them. Existing
network analysis often takes expectations and obligations in embedded
ties as given. But, as Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) question, what kinds
of expectations are set about how an individual should reciprocate in
strong and weak ties? This article suggests that there is a pattern of
expectations in relation to tie strengths, and such a pattern can be ex-
plained by cultural rules. In the Chinese case, for example, giving face
to personal relationships that are closely to moderately connected is a
cultural rule. Buying life insurance in order to give face expresses the
significance of a particular relationship. Refusing to do so debases the
meanings of the relationship. Likewise, it is against the cultural rules that
render meanings to strong ties if one acts primarily on her or his self-
interest in an exchange. This explains why selling insurance to close ties
in order to gain commissions was socially disapproved of. These cultural
rules generate a pattern of expectations as to what kinds of tie strengths
should deliver what kinds of obligations. As such, cultural rules, through
the enforcing power of meanings, mold the pattern of the relation between
tie strengths and forms of economic transactions.
While economic actors are bounded by their preexisting structural po-
sitions and the associated cultural rules, they definitely have the capacity
to appropriate, reproduce, and innovate upon received cultural categories
and situations of action in accordance with their personal interests (Emir-
bayer and Goodwin 1994; Mizrachi, Drori, and Anspach 2007). A crucial
implication of integrating symbolic interactionism into network analysis
is its capacity to transcend a static model and to display the dynamical
nature of social embeddedness. DiMaggio (1992) comments that the struc-
tural models of embeddedness treat network membership and the access
of each member to relations with others as fixed. The Chinese life insur-
ance transactions compellingly demonstrate that even in a hierarchical
network structure as solidified as the one of Chinese social relations,
dramaturgical performances and interactions, if enacted properly, are ca-
pable of modifying individual actors’ access to relations with others in a
network. This is where the use of a cultural tool kit as an exercise of
human agency comes to play. Although different types of preexisting re-
lations carry different configurations of enabling and constraining ele-
ments pertaining to economic exchanges, skillful dramaturgical perfor-
mances can either overcome the constraining elements by taking full
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advantage of the enabling ones or to some extent modify one’s structural
position to facilitate transactions. For instance, in intimate and close cir-
cles in which self-interested economic gains are illegitimate, the agents
downplay and moderate their economic gains from the transactions so as
to channel the prospects to interact with them according to the ethical-
affective principle. In distant circles in which the level of trust and af-
fection is low and the element of calculation is high, the agents endeavor
to make guanxi with the prospects by acting as though they were close
friends or fictive kin to manufacture trust, affection, and indebtedness
from the prospects. If successful, they move their structural positions
closer to the Ego.
Whether the agents overcome the constraints or modify their structural
positions, they draw on their local knowledge, which is part of their
cultural tool kit, for guidance. For instance, agents Chang and Zhang
both chose to interact with their clients as fictive kin. Their choices were
informed, though not determined, by local knowledge that kinship bonds
carried a high intensity of the elements they intended to cultivate. To
successfully generate the kinds of trust, emotions, and obligatory credits
as they intended to, they needed to choose what kinds of fictive kin roles
they should perform and how to perform them effectively. Chang and
Zhang chose different fictive kin roles to orchestrate different obligatory
credits. The former acted as a filial daughter-in-law to induce a deep
feeling of indebtedness from her client; the latter acted as a naive sister
to earn her client’s sympathy. Their different strategic choices illustrate
that what kind of obligatory credits their clients hold depends on what
the agents do and how their favors are received and interpreted. In other
words, it depends on how the agents mobilize and organize the symbols
of reciprocity and how the prospects and clients read these symbols. There-
fore, while their structural positions and the preexisting relational prop-
erties stipulate that they need to interact with their sales targets in a
certain way in order to succeed, there is no single formula for doing so.
The actual interactions are subject to the actors’ creativity and mobili-
zation of local knowledge, interpersonal skills, and cultural symbols in
response to the binding forces of structures, cultural rules, and situations.
By conceiving culture as both cultural rules and repertoires, this article
casts light on the constitutive force of meaning and agency in socially
embedded economic exchanges.
Nevertheless, I should point out some limitations of this study and
what has been left out. First, it focuses only on the moments when trans-
actions take place without considering the long-term success of such trans-
actions. It does not take into account the lapses of the insurance policies
sold through different forms of embeddedness. Some scant data from my
field research suggest that clients who bought their policies through re-
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flexive trust complained about the policies the most. This makes sense
since these clients bought the policies without knowing what they were.
I suspect that policies sold through reflexive trust have the highest lapse
rate and those through personage transactions have the lowest. If so, it
will further strengthen the argument that transactions among strong ties
are less than ideal.
Second, this study centers on dyadic direct transactions without in-
vestigating mediated transactions.20 How do different tie strengths func-
tion differently in mediated transactions? Bian’s (1997) study on job
searches suggests that strong ties serve as a better bridge than weak ties
in China. I suspect that this may hold for other types of mediated economic
activities, including negotiated exchanges. For instance, if an intermediary
has strong ties with both a sales agent and a prospect, the prospect is
likely to trust the agent and to feel obligated to buy from the agent. To
connect relational properties to the structure of tie strengths, it will be
useful to study various combinations of mediated ties in terms of tie
strengths. How would a two-strong-link triadic connection differ from a
one-strong-link connection for business deals in China? How would the
outcome be different if the one strong link were between an intermediary
and a seller versus one between an intermediary and a prospect? The
analytic frame that connects various relational properties to tie strengths
is useful for hypothesizing the possible outcomes that go beyond dyadic
transactions, especially with respect to the roles of trust and both asym-
metric and symmetric obligations.
Finally, while different categories of Chinese social relations are pre-
sented, this study has little to say about how different categories of social
relations, other than tie strengths, affect transactions. How do kinship
and friendship differ in reflexive trust and obligatory transactions? How
does trading with personal friends, even the loosely connected ones, differ
from trading with long-term business friends? Most extant literature on
embeddedness focuses on long-term business relationships. But, given that
the history of a social relationship matters (Granovetter 1990), it is likely
that different types of relations within a tie strength affect economic trans-
actions differently. At least in Chinese societies, strong ties that started
off as friends carry different meanings than strong ties that started off as
business relationships. While it may be a problem to engage in direct
economic transactions with the former type of strong ties, it may be an
asset to do it with the latter type. All these questions and concerns await
future research that put the content of social relations at the center of
inquiry.
20 For a concise discussion of linking dyadic exchanges to macro structures and net-
works, see Emerson (1976).
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TABLE A1
Summary of Socioeconomic Profiles of the Interviewees in Shanghai
Insurance Practitioners
Sales Agents
Managerial
Staff
Gender:
Male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 33
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 11
Age:
20–29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4
30–39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 19
40–49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 19
50–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2
Seniority:*
Senior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 NA
Junior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 NA
Division:
General management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 8
Marketing and agency management . . . . . . . NA 18
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 7
Product development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 8
Public relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 3
Clients and Prospects
Clients Prospects
Gender:
Male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 16
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 19
Age:
20–29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8
30–39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16
40–49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6
50–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5
60 or above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . .
Annual income (yuan):
! 18,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9
18,000–36,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12
36,000–84,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10
84,000–120,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3
1 120,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1
Occupation:†
Blue-collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 13
Lower-level white-collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 10
Upper-level white-collar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 9
Self-employed/owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3
* “Senior” refers to those who have been working as insurance sales agents for two years or more,
and “junior” refers to those who have been working for less than two years.
† “Lower-level white-collar” refers to office employees in lower ranks such as clerks, secretaries, sales
representatives, and officers. “Upper-level white-collar” refers to various managerial personnel and
professionals.
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